

DEMOSTHENES' FIRST PHILIPPIC: THE SATIRIC MODE

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The disposition of Demosthenes' *First Philippic* has provoked increasingly puzzled comment beginning with Friedrich Blass,¹ who remarked on the almost imperceptible translations from one thought to the next, and culminating in the studies of Marcel Delaunois, whose thesis, *le plan psychologique*, attributes mystical properties to the arrangement.² At first sight there seems little justification for this state of perplexity. Demosthenes proceeds in an orderly manner from one topic to the next. He is careful, moreover, to indicate the major divisions and digressions of his discourse.³ It is only after one has begun to concentrate

¹ F. Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit* (Leipzig 1893) 3.1.304. Cf. also H. Schefczik, "Der logische Aufbau der ersten philippischen Rede des Demosthenes," *Jahresber. Gymn. Troppau* (1905) 3-16; H. Kesters, "Demosthenes' eerste Philippische rede," *Nova et Vetera (B)* [Hence abbreviated as *NV(B)*] 1932, 455-64. I have not seen E. Bottek, *Dispositive Inhaltsübersicht zu Demosthenes' 8 Staatsreden* (Vienna 1894) and G. Timmermans, "Over de ordening der gedachten bij Demosthenes," *NV(B)* 1953, 103-11. Other studies devoted to arrangement will be cited below. Of course the redaction question raised by Dionysius of Halicarnassus has prompted investigation of the unity of the speech, and the result has been, for the most part, affirmative. Cf. A. Baran, "Die einheitliche Composition der ersten Philippica des Demosthenes," *WS* 6 (1884) 173-204. The main concern of this study, however, is not the unity of the speech, which is assumed, but the plan and purpose of its disposition.

² Marcel Delaunois, "Du plan logique au plan psychologique chez Démosthène," *EtCl* 19 (1951) 178 and *Le plan rhétorique dans l'éloquence grecque d'Homère à Démosthène* (Brussels 1959) 77-88. The work of Delaunois is an extension of a study by Abbé José-M. Gilot, "Le plan de la 1^{re} Philippique," *Bulletin du Cercle pédagogique de l'Université de Louvain* 1950, 11-16. Cf. also the somewhat fanciful study of H. De Raedt, "Plan psychologique de la première Philippique de Démosthène," *EtCl* 19 (1951) 227-29.

³ Lionel Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 96, speaking of the later political speeches (including the *First Philippic*): "there is no effort to make more than one point at a time, and the reader feels no need of any outline or analysis to help him keep his bearings, or show him in what direction the argument is leading." Similarly D. Bede Lebbe, "De l'enchaînement des parties

on the ideas within the topics that a pattern of recurrences emerges whose intricacy baffles attempts to outline it systematically.⁴ In the *First Philippic*, as in many of Demosthenes' best orations, recurrence is not a heavy repetition of ideas, but a subtle process of elaboration and development bringing to light new dimensions of meaning and sensation. Delaunois compared this Protean sameness to symphonic compositions whose themes alternate or combine in variations of melody and orchestration⁵—a comparison which, though perhaps intended to describe only a compositional process, suggests at the same time aesthetic possibilities in Demosthenes' oratory, which in turn may help to understand the relevance of *le plan psychologique* to Demosthenes' persuasive purpose. My interest in this problem was first awakened by the *Oration on the Crown*, where I found that recurrent themes and language created two diametrically opposed aesthetic categories, the comic and the tragic, employed as modes of persuasion.⁶ The former was a *confutatio*; Demosthenes' opponent, Aeschines, was discredited as the *alazôn*—the ridiculous impostor of the comic stage. The *confirmatio* was a tragic ennoblement of the disaster of Chaeronea for which Demosthenes' policies had been responsible. Subsequently, the *First Philippic* has revealed the use of recurrence to establish a third aesthetic mode of persuasion—the satiric.

The satiric, as a category of perception, is not limited to literature. It has, in fact, enjoyed in other branches of art a distinguished history. The graphic arts, especially, have given it such striking expression that even if one is concerned with literary satire he does well to contem-

dans les discours de Démosthène," *NV(B)* 1922, 275: "Ce n'est plus l'ordonnance traditionnelle, la marche ordinaire de l'argumentation; cependant la suite des idées est toujours claire et l'on peut, sans beaucoup d'hésitation, reconnaître le 'plan' de Démosthène."

⁴ The best statement of the problem is that of J. Sampaix, "Quelques notes pour l'étude littéraire de la 1^{re} Philippique de Démosthène," *NV(B)* 1937, 24, who, after presenting a concise outline of the oration, states, "C'est faire une remarque banale que souligner la grande difficulté que l'on éprouve à enserrer dans le cadre d'un plan, le développement de la pensée de Démosthène. Une fois ce plan établi, on n'en est jamais pleinement satisfait, car on a toujours l'impression que certains éléments ont échappé; on se demande même si l'essentiel du discours y est entièrement compris."

⁵ Delaunois, "Du plan logique" (above, note 2) 186. Cf. also Gilot (above, note 2) 16.

⁶ "The Portrait of Aeschines in the *Oration on the Crown*," *TAPA* 97 (1966) 397-406.

plate the illustrations of Hogarth or of Bruegel the Elder, since literary satire, with its emphasis on narrative and description seems to strive for a uniquely pictorial form of existence. A highly pictorial quality distinguishes the *First Philippic* from Demosthenes' previous speeches; though comprising only thirteen and a half pages in the Oxford Classical Text, the speech contains an unusual proportion of metaphors and similes, not to mention other elements that may be considered imagistic.⁷ These images manifest the satiric traits of the incongruous, the distorted, the inane, and the paradoxical. Their cumulative effect is a *mundus perversus* reminiscent of Bruegel's *Flemish Proverbs*.⁸ Writing, however, and music differ from painting insofar as the latter presents the viewer with the total scene at a single glance, whereas in literature and music the reader, or the listener, follows a descriptive process to its completion. With this simple distinction in mind, we can understand why that which Delaunois calls *le plan psychologique* was essential to Demosthenes' purpose in the *First Philippic*. He wished to convey to the Athenians an image of themselves as the *mundus perversus*, and recurrence was a means of maintaining and developing this image to its completion.⁹

⁷ Blass (above, note 1) 303. Cf. also Dietrich Krüger, *Die Bildersprache des Demosthenes* (Göttingen 1959) 91; Aimé Puech, *Les Philippiques de Démosthène* (Paris 1929) 57. Gilberté Ronnet, *Étude sur le style de Démosthène dans les discours politiques* (Paris 1951) 150-51, finds in the *First Philippic* a significant increase of metaphors over previous speeches. The number of metaphors, however, is only a partial indication of the highly imagistic quality of the speech.

⁸ Charles De Tolnay, *Pierre Bruegel l'Ancien* (Brussels 1935) 24, speaks of the painting as an "image cosmique du monde renversé." Bruegel represented pictorially a certain type of proverb which focused on ridiculous and absurd behavior. This type, which bears the special name *τὸ ἀδύνατον*, is frequently encountered in the collections of ancient Greek proverbs. Cf. E. L. Leutsch and F. G. Schneidewin, *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum*, especially the so-called *Eclogue of Plutarch* in vol. 1, 343-48 (Hildesheim, photo-reprint, 1965). Cf. K. Rupprecht, "*Παροιμία*," *RE* 18.4.1713-14, and my article "The Adynaton as a Stylistic Device," *AJP* 86 (1965) 387-96. This particular vision of the *mundus perversus*, which may be found in folk-literature and in Bruegel's art, has received increasing attention from scholars of satire. Klaus Lazarowicz, *Verkehrte Welt* (Tübingen 1963) 312, goes so far as to say, "Wir schlagen vor, den Begriff Satire nur dort anzuwenden, wo der künstlerische Aufbau einer verkehrten Welt angestrebt und . . . geleistet worden ist." Ronald Paulson, *The Fictions of Satire* (Baltimore 1967) 38, speaks of the "irrationality and topsy-turvydom" of Lucian's satire.

⁹ A reviewer (H. D.) of H. Schefczik (above, note 1) in *WKP* 47 (1905) 1279, states with keen perception that the recurrence "ist aber nicht Wiederholung, sondern Steigerung."

What follows is an attempt to trace the compositional process of Demosthenes' *mundus perversus* by first examining sets of recurrent imagery, which, for clarity's sake, have been divided into two main types and labeled somewhat arbitrarily as "descriptive" and "tropical." By "descriptive" is meant a recurrent image whose content is a more or less historical situation described in satiric form. "Tropical imagery" applies to recurrent metaphors and similes. After examining the development of the recurrent images and their cumulative effect, I shall consider briefly other elements in the oration which belong to the special rhetoric of satire and which combine with the imagery to create Demosthenes' satiric mode of persuasion.

After a general exhortation on the need for appropriate action (1-12), Demosthenes presents two proposals. The first (16-19), urging a substantial reserve force of Athenian ships and men to stand ready for Philip's sudden acts of aggression, is mentioned briefly and does not return for further discussion. The second proposal (19), on the other hand, provides the focal point of the oration—the nucleus, in fact, of subsequent descriptive imagery:

Men of Athens, you should keep in hand some force that will constantly make war and annoy him: none of your ten thousand or twice ten thousand mercenaries, none of your "letterary forces," but one that shall be the state's; and one which, whether you appoint one or more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow him. I also recommend that subsistence be provided for it.

The statement is at once obvious and ambiguous. It is, after all, a simple proposal of what the military force should be and how it should perform. Yet one does not need to look closely to detect the disturbing satiric presence in the form of irony.¹⁰ The extreme obviousness—it seems unnecessary to say that the force should belong to Athens, that it should follow and obey its commander, and that it should be provided subsistence—the comic ellipsis ("none of your ten thousand . . ."), the unusual adjective with its incongruous relationship to its noun ("letterary" forces),¹¹ suggest latent meaning soon to be revealed.

¹⁰ Cf. Sampaix, "Le comique, l'ironie dans la 1^{ère} Philippique de Démosthène: essais de traductions, commentaires, notes," *NV(B)* 1937, 312.

¹¹ Admittedly, the rendering of *ἐπιστολιμαίους* by "letterary" is somewhat strained. The more common translation, "forces on paper" (J. E. Sandys, *The First Philippic*

Beginning with "none of your ten thousand or twice ten thousand mercenaries, none of your 'letterary' forces," the first set of recurrent descriptive imagery deals with the nature of Athens' expeditions against the enemy. The ellipsis suggests an allusion of some kind, perhaps a reference to a specific historical situation.¹² But it is also allusive in a second sense; that is, it points to further elaboration in the text, which, after an intermission of about 7 lines, appears in the next section (20):

Mercenaries I say; but take care not to do what has often harmed you. Thinking everything insufficient, you adopt the mightiest measures in decrees; but when it comes to action you fail to do the slightest.

It is now possible to see that the "ten thousand or twice ten thousand mercenaries" refers to exorbitant forces authorized by the Athenians but in fact non-existent. Not only has the meaning become clearer; the satiric incongruity is more pronounced through the antithesis between pretentious decrees and actual inertia. But the satiric image has only just begun to emerge. Ten sections later (30) Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians, by accepting his proposal, will fight Philip not only in decrees and letters but also with deeds. Here the specific mention of Philip, whose energetic behavior had been described earlier in stark contrast to Athenian apathy (4-6), advances the mood from the merely incongruous to the absurd, as we are caused to visualize the Athenians ludicrously battling their enemy with decrees and letters rather than with armies. In 44 the absurdity receives further articulation, as Demosthenes indicates how an Athenian-decreed expedition appears in practice: "If you send on an expedition empty triremes and

and the *Olynthiacs of Demosthenes* [London 1910] 89), however, tends to weaken the continuity which I seek to emphasize between *ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις* in section 19 and *ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ* in section 30.

¹² Demosthenes may be alluding to a specific situation where a large body of mercenaries and a letter were involved; but I am unable to find in modern scholarship any attempt to identify it. A scholiast (J. G. Baiter and H. Sauppe, *Oratores Attici* [Zurich 1850] 2.67) identifies the passage as an allusion to Chares' expedition on behalf of Artabazus. This explanation is neither upheld nor even mentioned in any of the commentaries I have seen. T. Gwatkin, *Demosthenes, The First Philippic* (London 1895) *ad loc.*, seems to indicate that the reference is a general one, describing a habitual practice rather than a specific event. Similarly cf. E. Schwartz, *Demosthenes Erste Philippika* (Marburg 1893) 46-47.

the hopes of so-and-so, do you think that everything will turn out all right?" Finally the image attains its satiric perfection some 9 lines later (45):

Wherever you dispatch a general and an empty decree and hopes from the rostrum, none of your needs is fulfilled; instead, your enemies have a good laugh, while your allies stand in mortal fear of such expeditions as these.¹³

The processes of alternation and combination are at work in this recurrent image. Basic words such as "decrees," "letters," and "hopes" are reiterated but not in monotonous fashion. By the repetition of the same words and by their combination with non-recurrent elements (e.g. "triremes," "Philip," and "general") the image is caused to grow organically. For example, the inflated number of mercenaries (*μυρίους μηδὲ δισμυρίους ξένους*) is explained in the second instance by "the mightiest measures in decrees" (*τὰ μέγιστ' ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι*); and in the third instance the unusual "letterary forces" (*τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις*) becomes mere "letters" and combines with "decrees" (*ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ*). Likewise "empty triremes" in the fourth instance becomes "empty decree" in the fifth. Another sign of organic development may be seen in the fourth and fifth instances, where the question raised in the fourth, "do you think that everything will turn out all right?" is answered in the fifth by "none of your needs is fulfilled; instead, your enemies have a good laugh, while your allies stand in mortal fear of such expeditions as those." In addition to the alternation

¹³ Friedrich Focke, "Demosthenesstudien," *Genethiakon Wilhelm Schmid* (Stuttgart 1929) 25-26, believes that this passage and the preceding one (43) refer to the expedition of Charidemus to Heraeon Teichos. Possibly Demosthenes' words evoked the memory of that occasion, but his failure to be specific here and elsewhere can only be intentional. Schwartz (above, note 12) 46-47 believes that Demosthenes' lack of specificity is due primarily to political considerations, but I do not feel that this explanation is adequate in every instance of vagueness. A more inclusive explanation is the oration's satiric manner of portrayal which avoids the specific fact, since that would entail a context of mitigating circumstances. Cf. Kurt Wölfel, "Epische Welt und satirische Welt," *Wirkendes Wort* 10 (1960) 90-91: "Proportionen zu vertauschen, Verhältnisse umzukehren, den gewöhnlichen Nexus der Dinge zu lösen—das bestimmt den Rang und den Vorzug satirischer Kunstwerke." In only one of the descriptive images is Demosthenes specific, and that is where he describes the mercenaries sailing off to Artabazus (24); but here the mention of a Persian satrap enhances the bizarre aspect of the description. Notice also that *πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον* is immediately followed by *καὶ πανταχοῖ μάλλον*.

of recurrent words and ideas, the logical sequence of the action assists in maintaining the organic unity of the image. Thus the description of the Athenian expedition begins with its conception in the assembly and culminates in the actual effect that it exercises on friend and foe alike. Demosthenes has capitalized on this logical sequence from conception to action in order to demonstrate the total perversion of the situation. For as the need for concrete action becomes more and more logically apparent, the failure of the conception to materialize becomes increasingly absurd. Starting out in the assembly as ten thousand or twice ten thousand mercenaries, Athens' expedition ends up on the battlefield as an empty decree and hopes; and what was intended to be a source of comfort to the allies and a threat to the enemy has had exactly the opposite effect. To the culminating absurdity of this last passage is added the moral condemnation suggested by the scornful *καταγελῶσιν*.

The second recurrent descriptive image, though brief, is nevertheless highly effective. It begins in the nucleus passage (19) with the obvious assertion that the force proposed by Demosthenes "will be the city's." But in 24 the latent irony is revealed when Demosthenes explains that presently Athens' forces, consisting solely of mercenaries, vanquish friends and allies, while her enemies become unduly powerful—behavior which is hardly representative of Athenian intentions.¹⁴ Isocrates (*On the Peace* 46) some five or six years earlier had also described the detrimental effects of mercenaries. Speaking more factually, if also more prosaically, he had stated that Athens through mercenaries was tormenting her friends and exacting tribute from them (*τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν λυμαινόμεθα καὶ δασμολογοῦμεν*). But Demosthenes' *mundus perversus* demands that the situation be completely distorted through exaggeration; "vanquish" (*νικᾷ*) is the word he adopts rather than Isocrates' "torment" and "exact tribute." The final recurrence of the image appear as the passage continues. After performing in direct contradiction to its purpose, Athens' force throws a passing glance at the city's war and sails off to Artabazus or

¹⁴ The observation of Sampaix (above, note 10) 313 is worth noting: "Le comique a pour objet le renversement de situation; il est marqué par le rapprochement de *ὑμῶν* et *τοὺς φίλους*; 'c'est pour vous qu'ils font la guerre et ce sont vos amis qu'ils battent.'" I would substitute, however, the word "satirique" for Sampaix's "comique."

any place else. The irony of the situation, heightened by the comic word *παρακύψαντ(α)*,¹⁵ is now abundantly clear. The troops employed by Athens to fight her war cannot be regarded as her own; instead of conquering the enemy, they conquer her allies, and instead of proceeding to Athens' war, they sail off to fight for a Persian satrap. A second Athenian assumption has been graphically reduced to the absurd.

Returning to the nucleus (section 19), we find that the next image depicts Athens' generals. The statement, "whether you appoint one or more or this or that man or any other as general," generates interest by its remarkable prolongation enhanced through polysyndeton. What intent lies behind this expression is not entirely clear. The prolongation suggests, however, an ample supply of generals; and this, in section 26, proves to be what Demosthenes was leading up to:

Suppose someone would ask you, "are you at peace, men of Athens?" You would reply, "Good Heavens, no; we are at war with Philip." Have you not been voting from among yourselves ten captains and generals, and cavalry-officers, and two masters-of-the-horse? Very well, what are they doing? Except for the solitary fellow you send off to battle, they are all putting on parades with the festival commissioners. Just like those who produce clay soldiers, you commission your captains and cavalry officers for the marketplace, not for the battle.

The inflated notion of Athenian generalship, prepared in the nucleus and built up in this passage, is rapidly dispelled when it is revealed that only one of the generals actually goes to the front. Demosthenes is not satisfied with presenting merely the inanity of the situation; he must further distort the image to the point of absurdity. The association of the generals with such frivolous items as toys and parades demonstrates how thoroughly perverted the image of military command has become on Demosthenes' canvas of the *mundus perversus*. The final manipulation of the image occurs near the end of the speech (47):

Now matters have reached such a degree of shame that each of your commanders is brought to court two or three times for his life; but not one of them dares to put his life on trial with your enemies. He chooses the death of clothes-stealers and kidnappers rather than that of honor. For it is the convict who dies by sentence of jury; the general dies fighting the enemy.

¹⁵ Sandys (above, note 11) 94.

Again the perverted behavior of the generals is stressed, but the ridiculous aspects of the previous passage (26) have been replaced here by a sober, ethical tone. "Shame" and "honor," concretely represented by generals who are put on trial and generals who fight the enemy, reveal at the conclusion of the image the persuasive function of Demosthenes' satiric mode.¹⁶ Through satire's double vision the aberration of the present is refuted and the realistic action of the future, embodied by Demosthenes' proposal, is enhanced.

Like the two preceding images which have been examined, the image of the generals develops through a logical sequence. In the first passage the selection of the general is described, in the second passage his commission, and in the third passage his struggle, or *agôn*. With each successive failure of the general to fulfil this logical, or at least natural, dimension, the image becomes increasingly absurd and perverted. Each passage stresses the supposed abundance of commanders—a fact which lends additional continuity and cohesiveness, and heightens the inanity of the successive descriptions. The final passage not only culminates in complete distortion but also supplies a moral judgment.

The fourth and final image in the descriptive group begins in the nucleus with the assertion that the force proposed by Demosthenes "will obey and follow" its commander and that "subsistence be provided for it." What Demosthenes stipulates here are working conditions usually so normal for an army as to seem unnecessary to be mentioned; but his intent becomes clear in section 24: the present mercenary forces, after vanquishing friends and allies, throw a passing glance at Athens' war and sail off to Artabazus, their general following them of course; "you can't lead, if you don't pay." Thus Demosthenes' insistence on the obvious in his first statement is shown to be justified by the exactly opposite behavior of the army in the field. The bizarreness of the army leading its general is heightened stylistically by the oxymoron, *ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ*, although in order to create it Demosthenes

¹⁶ The passage *κακούργου μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κριθέντ' ἀποθανεῖν, στρατηγοῦ δὲ μαχόμενον τοῖς πολεμίοις* is regarded "as only dubiously Demosthenic" by H. Musurillo, "A Critical Note on Demosthenes' *First Philippic*," *CQ* 51 (1957) 88. It is Demosthenes' practice, however, to emphasize a moral, especially at the completion of each descriptive image, as is the case here.

violates his rule of avoiding more than two consecutive breves.¹⁷ The ridiculous reversal of the rôles of leading and following in the case of the mercenary force and its general next becomes symbolic of Athens' entire conduct of the war. In section 39 Demosthenes remarks that "those who conduct war properly must not follow events but be in front of them; and just as anyone would assume that a general leads his troops, so should those who set policy lead events." In the present situation, however, the enemy is Athens' general (στρατηγείσθ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου); for wherever Philip marches, the Athenians follow—always too late, of course, to stop him (41).¹⁸ Finally both the specific and the general meanings of the image combine in 46:

Whenever a general leads wretched, unpaid mercenaries, and when there are those here who nonchalantly lie to you about what he does, and when you vote haphazardly on the basis of what you hear, what must you expect?

This time in a single passage we are made to see the futile nature of Athenian leadership both in the army and in the assembly. The futility is explained both implicitly and explicitly as resulting from a fundamental disparity of words and deeds. Just as the mercenaries are deceived in the matter of their pay, so are the Athenians deceived about what is going on. Finally, the question "What must you expect?" concludes the image by calling for judgment.

The development through recurrence in this final descriptive image differs somewhat from that in the three preceding images, where the

¹⁷ Sandys (above, note 11) 94.

¹⁸ Sampaix (above, note 10) 315 notes "le renversement de situation," but regards it as a cause "du comique." Again (cf. above, note 14) I feel obliged to object to this term in connection with the *First Philippic*. The tenor of the oration has none of the triumphant freedom which is associated with comedy. Irony is not employed here to liberate the individual from restrictive and oppressive social and ethical conventions. In fact, its function in the *First Philippic* is almost the opposite—to expose what constitutes to Demosthenes, at least, a departure from ethical norms. The problem of humor in Demosthenes' oratory is one of long standing in ancient and modern criticism. Cf. Blass (above, note 1) 186–90; Stanislaus Lisecki, "Demosthenes orationes suas salibusne condiderit," *Eos* 30 (1927) 93–100, and R. J. Bonner, "Wit and Humor in Athenian Courts," *CP* 1922, 97–103. The general consensus is, as C. D. Adams states, that Demosthenes "is too stern and too intense for humor, and the pleasant play of wit does not appeal to him. With Demosthenes wit is a weapon, not an ornament or a relaxation" (*Demosthenes and His Influence* [New York 1963] 66).

progress tends toward increasing clarity and absurdity. This last image develops from the specific (i.e. leadership in the army) to the general (i.e. leadership in the entire political situation). On each level we are presented first with the sensible ideal (i.e. generals should lead their armies and statesmen should lead events), followed by a demonstration of the nonsensical reality—the total perversion of the concept of leadership. This alternation between the sensible ideal and the nonsensical reality is in keeping with satire's function of demonstrating the corruption of an ideal. Likewise, that the sensible ideal should be presented first and then followed by its contradiction in fact is effective for satire, which "judges by consequences rather than by causes of motives."¹⁹

Thus far we have dealt with the satirical treatment of recurrent historical themes. These occupy the greatest portion of Demosthenes' composition; but they are further enhanced by two sets of recurrent tropical images—the chase and the physical combat. The two images, in one sense, supplement the historical war themes by their agonistic import; but in another sense they create a tone of incongruity, as they derive from the peaceful realm of leisure and play. One instance of this peace-in-war incongruity has been seen already in the description of generals leading parades in the agora rather than troops on the battlefield (26). The tropical imagery, however, sustains the bizarre notion of Athens' playful attitude toward war throughout most of the oration. It is significant also that the tropical imagery begins early in the speech, preparing, as it were, for the more specific meaning contained by the descriptive imagery. Within each of the two tropical images the perverting principle is at work, as we shall see next.

In the hunt the Athenians make excellent quarry, sitting idly while Philip throws his nets all around (9, *προσπεριβάλλεται καὶ κύκλω πανταχῇ μέλλοντας ἡμᾶς καὶ καθημένους περιστοιχίζεται*). As hunters, however, they are only ridiculous, dashing in pursuit of events which have already transpired (39, *τὰ συμβάντ' ἀναγκάζονται διώκειν*) or chasing after Philip's heels o'er hill and dale (41, *συμπαρθεῖτ' ἄνω κάτω*). In the realm of boxing and wrestling the Athenians are equally inane and foolish. Using a wrestling metaphor (5), Demosthenes represents Philip as the aggressive challenger, while Athens stands

¹⁹ Paulson (above, note 8) 10.

listlessly ignoring the valuable prizes placed in the center of the arena.²⁰ In a second, slight allusion to wrestling, Demosthenes asserts that the realistic measures which he has proposed provide the opportunity to catch Philip "off guard" (18, ἀφύλακτος), but under the present circumstances Athens fights in the same way as the barbarians box (40):

Every time one of them is hit, he goes for the blow; and if you hit him somewhere else, there go his hands again. He has neither the sense nor the will to protect himself or to face his opponent.

This final instance of the combat imagery has effected a complete reversal of rôles. Athenians fight like barbarians, and barbarians fight like Athenians. The devastating force of the imagery, however, is the suggestion of total meaninglessness. Even in sport and festival—activities to which Athens preferred to devote her attention and zeal rather than to the struggle for Greek freedom—Demosthenes represents her as incompetent and ridiculous.

The completed graphic process presents us with a *mundus perversus* in which inanity, incongruity, and absurdity abound. Athens fights Philip with letters and decrees rather than with arms; her generals sail off to war in empty triremes, equipped only with hopes and decrees; the enemy laughs, the allies fear. The force which is supposed to conquer Philip conquers Athens' friends and allies; and, instead of proceeding to Athens' war, it sails off to fight for a Persian satrap. None of Athens' commanders has done what was expected of him. Instead of leading, they follow; instead of going to battle, they go to market; instead of standing the trial of battle, they prefer the trial of larceny. In fact, the true general of Athens is Philip. For the Athenians follow him wherever he goes. Pervading this topsy-turvy battle-mural are the incongruous images of peace—the futile chase and the inept boxing match in which the rôles of barbarian and Athenian have been reversed.

While the recurrent images establish and develop the satiric mode throughout the oration, they are not the sole evidence of Demosthenes' unique persuasive purpose. The special rhetoric of satire is everywhere apparent. Paradox, antithesis, and caricature are found both in the

²⁰ The metaphorical content of this passage is attested by the scholia (above, note 12) and Sandys (above, note 11) 76.

images themselves and in other passages. The first sentence after the prooemium sets the tone of the oration with a paradox (2):

Men of Athens, we must not lose hope at the present state of affairs, not even if it seems quite wretched. For what in the past was the worst, this promises to be the best for the future.

Antithesis, of course, is encountered constantly. One instance is effective for revealing the incongruity between initial and final intentions in the war with Philip (43): "I marvel that none of you is concerned or incensed when he sees that the object of the war in the beginning was to punish Philip, but that in the end it is to avoid being ruined by Philip." Another antithesis points up the grotesque disparity between the Athenians' attention to the great festivals, in which everything is arranged and provided for, and their negligence in the preparations for war (35-36). A caricature of a "typical" Athenian expedition makes the point even more grotesque (36-37), and the graphic impression is that of a veritable *Narrenschiff*:

It is not until we have heard some news that we appoint men to fit out a trireme and for these we institute exchanges of property and we search for revenues. After this we decide that metics and freedmen should embark, then that we should go ourselves, but then that we should send substitutes on board, while during all this delay the object of our voyage is lost.²¹

A famous instance of the imaginary dialogue (*sermo*) points to the Cynic and Stoic diatribes and Roman satire (10-11):

"Is there any news?"

Could anything be newer than that a Macedonian is beating the Athenians and running the affairs of Greece?

"Is Philip dead?"

"No, by Heavens, but he is sick."

What difference does that make to you? For even if something does happen to him, you will soon create another Philip, if this is the way you tend to business.²²

²¹ For some interesting observations on this passage see Ronnet (above, note 7) 107 and Sampaix (above, note 10) 314-15.

²² Ronnet (above, note 7) 125 worries about the naturalness of the dialogue in this passage ("Mais s'il est vraiment vivant, est-il également naturel?"), but that is to consider it as an isolated ploy rather than as an integral part of satiric rhetoric which is, in fact, the dominant expression of the *First Philippic*.

The constant use of satire's special rhetoric, not only in the recurrent images but in other passages as well, serves to integrate all the expository elements of the oration. Demosthenes' recurrent images and rhetorical figures convey a confused, complacent, and fantastic world in which occurs all that is improbable, inane, and foolish.

Although the creation of the *mundus perversus* is an aesthetic achievement of the first order, it is not for satire, at least, an end in itself. As one contemporary scholar has neatly stated,

To the extent that satire presents, and so represents, its "object," it is related to other mimetic forms. But to the extent that satire attacks, it is rhetorical—the *vituperatio* of *laus et vituperatio*—and there is a persuasive end in sight.²³

Demosthenes' primary purpose in the *First Philippic* was to exorcise Athens' sterile approach to warfare by demonstrating both its futility and its senseless lack of realism. While it cannot be said that he was not serious about his proposal, what he wanted to achieve most by his oration was a change in attitude. Accordingly he adopted as the basic forming principle one of the most ethical, and at the same time persuasive, of aesthetic categories—the satiric.

²³ Paulson (above, note 8) 3. It is beyond the scope of this article to seek to explain how the mimetic aspect of satire is, or can be, persuasive. For an example of how involved such an attempt can become, cf. Joseph Bentley, "Satire and the Rhetoric of Sadism," *Centennial Review* 11 (1967) 387-404.